Remarks to the NFACR China Capability Roundtable
Remarks
21 January, 2026
Hosted by the National Foundation for Australia-China Relations
Sydney
I acknowledge the traditional custodians of the land on which we meet, the Gadigal people of the Eora Nation.
I acknowledge Elders past and present and any Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people here with us today.
I thank Gary Cowan and the National Foundation for Australia China Relations for hosting today’s roundtable.
As you are all aware, we are navigating the most complex strategic environment since the end of World War II.
Major powers are changing how they engage and assert themselves and geostrategic competition is intensifying.
Everyone here is aware that Australia’s security and prosperity rely on our ability to make our own way in our region.
A region that is more dynamic, complex and consequential than ever before.
Our current circumstances are asking more of our leaders, our institutions, our diplomats, our defence leaders, our business executives and board directors.
For our leaders and institutions to be effective in these changing conditions, we need them to be Asia capable.
Asia capability is a vital sovereign capability for our nation, and is the foundation of everything we want to do in the region.
It underpins the effectiveness of all spheres of our national endeavour, including our statecraft, our industry and civil society.
As Chair of the House Standing Committee on Education, I drove the establishment of the current Parliamentary inquiry into Australia’s Asia Capability.
We recognise that under the broad banner of Asia capability in Australia, there are specific challenges and opportunities for each country, including China.
That is why we are having country-specific roundtables like this one.
We have brought you all together today to discuss the barriers to building China capability in Australia, and policy recommendations to help boost Australia’s risk informed China capability in the national interest.
China is central to solving global challenges – from climate change and the energy transition, to global public health and trade.
But we are also realistic about China's objectives in changing the regional balance of power, as it continues to assert its strategic influence and project its power further into our region.
Now more than ever, we need the skills and expertise to be able to have risk-informed engagement with China in Australia’s national interest.
In their submission to the Inquiry, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade said “Australia has significant interests that require a strong China knowledge capability… The training of Australians in advanced Chinese language is central to our capability to engage China on our own terms, deepen our economic and people to people likes, and to manage our differences wisely.”
Unfortunately, as the Foundation advisory board’s submission to the inquiry stated, “Australia’s national China capability currently falls well short of the level required.”
Between 2010 to 2023, enrolments in Chinese language by year 12 students dropped by 41.7 per cent.
The Australian Academy of the Humanities 2023 report found that from 2017 – 2021, universities offering Chinese Studies graduated only 17 Australians with Honours: no more than five a year for that period.
And programs at universities are mainstreaming China-focused subjects into general subjects, meaning fewer students are graduating with expertise in Chinese studies.
Further, developing China capability requires time in China.
The Foundation says we need “deep expertise” built on mastery of the Chinese language, significant experience living and working in China and the ability to integrate expert knowledge of China into a broader context of Australia’s interests.
Some submissions to the inquiry have flagged that this necessary experience in-country can at times prevent individuals from finding work in Australia, particularly in government roles which require security clearances.
The submissions to the inquiry suggest that those China capable Australians we do have are often not using their experience and skills.
Other insights from the inquiry process suggest that some individuals start their China capability journey with learning the language at school, but opt-out due to perceived difficulty or a perceived lack of career opportunities.
Following current trajectories, the supply of China capable individuals will not meet what will be demanded by Australia’s national interest in the future.
It is a complex and multifaceted challenge.
We seek today to understand what is hampering the supply of China capable individuals, and what we can do about it.
We want to know:
What prevents students from starting or continuing their study of Chinese at school and university level?
What is preventing or deterring students from studying Chinese and/or Asian Studies as an area at University?
What prevents individuals from developing or deepening risk-informed China capability in the workplace?
We also want to know about practical policy recommendations to try solve this challenge.
We want to understand the demand-side levers to incentivise students to become China capable. We want to know how employers can better value and continue to train their China capable employees.
We want to understand how the Australia-China ecosystem can better support the development of a pipeline of people with these capabilities across academic, think tanks, NGOs, government and the business sector.
We want to know how we can better join up China capability pathways across an individual’s education and career journey.
And we want to know how we can better harness the considerable knowledge and expertise in the diaspora communities, noting that this knowledge complements but does not replace structured learning about the country.
Thank you for your time participating today, and I look forward to the discussion.

